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Abstract 
Following the 1999 intervention to quell the transitional violence in East Timor, the 
Australian Government began to vociferously promote itself as a defender and 
spreader of ―freedom and democracy‖ in the Asia-Pacific region.  This was followed, 
in 2003, with the surprising policy reversal that saw the insertion of the Australian-led 
intervention force in the Solomon Islands to stop civil violence in that country and 
begin building democratic institutions and a free society.  Once again, the case was 
made that Australia was a force for good in the region and was prepared to take a 
prominent role in spreading Western values to those that lacked them.  Much of this 
humanitarian rhetoric, however, has been challenged in the light of the chaotic scenes 
in both Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands in 2006.  This paper will argue that the 
claims of moral triumph and superiority that have accompanied the Australian 
interventions have had and will continue to have negative consequences for the people 
of Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands – as has been the case for the United States 
in Iraq and Afghanistan – and may even generate otherwise avoidable tensions with 
other regional powers.  The case will be made, in this context, for a more careful and 
conservative approach to regional engagement in order to avoid perpetual repetition 
of the social breakdown in our neighbourhood and to prevent Australian policy-
makers from developing a dangerously over-inflated sense of their position and power 
in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
 
Introduction 
In an interview on Australian talk-back radio on the 1
st
 of August this year, Prime 
Minister John Howard argued that the Australian military needed to be expanded due 
to the fact that ―you are going to for years into the future have a lot of Solomon 
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Islands-type calls on our defence force.‖1  Such a statement is troubling for a variety 
of reasons, not least of which was the call for the introduction of national service that 
were made by former head of the military Admiral Chris Barrie at around the same 
time as Howard‘s comment.2  If the region is in suh a parlous state and is likely to get 
worse in the years ahead, then we need to start asking more serous questions about 
what has gone wrong and what an interventionist response might entail.  We need to 
consider why Australia considers itself ―responsible‖ for carrying out such 
interventions, and we need to understand what the potential dangers of an 
interventionist foreign policy might be.  In making these enquiries, the examples of 
intervention in East Timor and Solomon Islands provide a great deal of insight.  Both 
can be used to illustrate the centrality of moral arguments in the Australian case for 
intervention, and both demonstrate the severe difficulties and high costs of 
maintaining an interventionist force and (re)building states that are considered to have 
―failed.‖ 
In the analysis to follow, I will set out the conservative or classical realist 
objection to moral universalism, humanitarianism, and the interventionism that 
accompanies it.  I will particularly focus upon the highly influential works of Carl 
Schmitt, E.H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau in establishing this argument.  This will be 
followed by discussions of Australian moral triumphalism in the cases of East Timor 
is 1999 and Solomon Islands in 2003, illustrating that the Australian Government has 
indeed chosen to justify its interventions in region in universal moral terms that can be 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Steve Price and Dave Harrison, Radio 4TO Townsville   (Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 1 August 2006 [cited 15 August 2006]); available from 
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview2053.html. 
2
 See Chris Barrie, "Procurement," in Growth 57 (Canberra: Committee for Economic Development of 
Australia, 2006). Barrie‘s call for national service were rejected by the Defence Minister Brendan 
Nelson, but in the current climate of increases in defence spending and continuing ‗war on terror‘ 
paranoia, it would not be at all surprising if the Prime Minister begins to bring the idea of national 
service onto the agenda in the months ahead.   
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subjected to conservative critique.  Finally, I will briefly discuss the outbreaks of 
violence in both Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands in the first half of 2006, before 
going on to argue that the ongoing trouble in those countries, combined with a variety 
of other Australian foreign policy decisions over recent years, indicate the potential 
dangers that are accruing as Australia continues to pursue an expansionist moral 
agenda.  
 
The Conservative Critique of Universal Moralism 
It was perhaps the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, who, writing of the failures of 
the Weimar Republic, best pinpointed the dangers of an emergent liberal 
humanitarianism in international politics as a recipe for ongoing wars of intervention.  
Within the context of his broader reading of (international) politics as the process of 
demarcating ‗Friend‘ (freund) from ‗Enemy‘ (fiend),3 Schmitt saw the development of 
a ‗moralistic‘ doctrine of war, supported by the thin liberal legalism of the League of 
Nations, as a grave danger.4  The key indicator of the emergence of this problem lay 
in the increasing use of the term ‗humanity‘ as the basis of a grievance which could 
justify war.  Thus the problem, according to Schmitt, was that: 
Humanity as such cannot wage a war because it has no enemy, at least not on this 
planet… When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war 
for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal 
concept against its military opponent.  At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify 
                                                 
3
 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. Tracy Strong, Translated from Das Begriff der 
Politischen [2nd Ed. 1934] ed. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1996). For a brief 
commentary on the significance of this distinction in broader ‗identity politics‘ terms see Iver B. 
Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 2, 
no. 2 (1996): 147. 
4
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. 
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itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and 
civilization in order to claim these as one‘s own and deny the same to the enemy.5 
For Schmitt, this characterisation of war as a battle for ‗humanity‘ was indicative of 
the evaporation of any sense of control or ‗formalism‘ in the conduct of war, leaving 
the potential to unleash horrific wars of annihilation which had previously been 
constrained by the European public law notion of war as a ―duel between formal 
states.‖6  In contrast to this more conservative and ‗balanced‘ legal tradition, guided 
by the principles of sovereignty inaugurated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the 
new legal moralism of liberal internationalists such as Woodrow Wilson would, 
according to Schmitt, lead to war without restraint, as:   
To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has 
certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and 
declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and war can thereby be driven to the most 
extreme inhumanity.
7
 
Koskenniemi further summarises Schmitt‘s argument, with particular reference to the 
idea of a humanitarian war, in explaining that: 
The humanitarian war becomes a war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg), a global civil 
war where the enemy does not have the dignity of a State and resistance will appear as 
―the illegal and immoral resistance of a few delinquents, troublemakers, pirates and 
gangsters.‖8 
Basing his argument on this fundamental question of definition, Schmitt contended 
that the notion of humanitarian war that he identified pointed to a larger crisis within 
international law, which he saw as being entirely beholden to political power and, 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 54. 
6
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall of international law, 1870-
1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 432. 
7
 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54.  Emphasis added. 
8
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960, 434.  
For a discussion on the significance of Schmitt‘s conception of the ‗global civil war‘ see Giorgio 
Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2-
3. 
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consequently, imperialist ambition.9  Hence, any attempt to claim authority for 
international acts through international law was, in effect, a particular political claim 
rather than a universal moral or legal claim, and should be acknowledged as such, not 
blurred by the rhetoric of ‗humanity‘.10 
 This perspective on the practical outcome of a universal liberal politics was 
later rendered familiar – albeit in slightly different terms - in the critiques of liberal 
‗utopianism‘ put forward in the shocking light of World War Two.  The classical 
Realist response to the apparent failure of the ‗liberal experiment‘ in international 
relations and the universalist legalism that accompanied it, emerging at the onset and 
flourishing at the end of the World War Two, is well known.  In critiquing the 
emphasis on universal principles that had been developed in European schools of 
international relations in the interwar years, E. H. Carr made the argument that all 
new academic disciplines begin with a period of idealism before ‗reality‘ shows it‘s 
ugly face and revisions are made by necessity. The embryonic discipline of 
International Relations, built upon the enthusiastic idealism of Woodrow Wilson in 
the aftermath of the World War One was, according to Carr, merely following this 
pattern.11 As a consequence of the naïve and delusional optimism regarding the 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion of this approach see Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall 
of international law, 1870-1960, 432-436. 
10
 Ibid., 434. Thus Schmitt advocated an end to the pretence of formality in international law, 
concluding that the end of the tradition of European international law, based around the protections of 
sovereignty, should now be set aside, to be replaced by a fluid politics of ‗decision‘ which would 
openly reflect the friend/enemy distinction that was, for Schmitt, the basis of all political life. Yet while 
Schmitt may have correctly identified political power, rather than universal values of humanity, as the 
basis for determining international legal norms, there was still no reason why such a perspective could 
not be equally adopted by those who still held a profound belief in the spread of liberal democracy as 
the path to world peace.  Indeed, it could be argued that Schmitt‘s notion of international law-as-power 
provided an even freer hand to the policy-maker intent on the propagation of universal morality, insofar 
as it removes the formal constraints of the laws of sovereignty that may previously have helped to 
shield states against intervention.  This is certainly the view taken by Koskenniemi, who argues that: 
―Schmitt‘s legacy was to inaugurate a dynamic and deformalized concept of law that would show its 
usefulness as the symbol of the concrete order that American power was able to produce.‖ See 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960, 483. 
11
 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 3-11. 
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eventual pacification of international relations, Carr argued, liberal internationalists 
had adopted a fantastical and mistaken notion of ‗harmony of interests‘ in which: 
supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the 
unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national 
interest at a particular time.  There is a sense in which peace and co-operation between 
nations or classes or individuals is a common and universal end irrespective of 
conflicting interests and politics.  There is a sense in which common interest exists in the 
maintenance of order, whether it be international order or ‗law and order‘ within the 
nation.  But as soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract principles 
to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish 
vested interests.
12
 
Thus the desire for a universal morality, from this perspective, is best understood as 
―the product of power.‖13  Through this lens, the ultimate ends of a utopian liberalism 
lay not in the promise of perpetual peace, but in the maintenance and expansion of a 
particular constellation of power.  Universal ambitions, in other words, were nothing 
more than the expressions of a national interest as understood by powerful national 
leaders and it was dangerous to think otherwise.14 
In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau, writing after the horror of 
World War Two, expanded on the initial concerns of Carr, setting out a conservative 
theory of diplomacy, under the ever-present umbrella of the ‗balance of power‘, in 
which rational statesmen engage in behaviour which seeks to maintain the status quo, 
always acting within the limits of their material power.15  From this perspective, the 
universal ambitions of liberals and idealists would only cause frequent imbalancing, 
and hence war, within the delicate anarchical system of international relations, as the 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 88-89. 
13
 Ibid., 64. 
14
 Ibid., 89. 
15
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, 4th ed. (1967), esp. 25-
33. 
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overzealous statesman would attempt to pour ―the contents of his national morality 
into the now almost empty bottle of universal ethics.‖16  The poverty of this approach, 
for Morgenthau, was evident in the fact that in the post-World War Two environment 
nations ―oppose each other… as the standard-bearers of ethical systems…the moral 
code of one nation flings the challenge of its universal claim with messianic fervour 
into the face of another, which reciprocates in kind. Compromise, the virtue of the old 
diplomacy, becomes the treason of the new.‖17  The outcome of this failure to 
recognise and accommodate plurality, and the concomitant failure to act prudently 
and in a compromising manner, is that: 
the world has room for only one, and the other must yield or be destroyed. Thus, carrying 
their idols before them, the nationalistic masses of our time meet in the international 
arena, each group convinced that it executes the mandate of history, that it does for 
humanity what it seems to do for itself, and that it fulfils a sacred mission ordained by 
Providence… little do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which the 
Gods have departed.
18
 
In illustrating the kinds of dangers that could arise from the adoption of such a moral 
posture, Morgenthau argued that the promotion of national self-determination, a prime 
concern of liberal internationalists then and now, was clearly implicated in the 
aggressive foreign policies of Nazi Germany, insofar as Hitler used the concept ―in 
order to disguise and justify his policies of territorial expansion.‖19  
In the late 1970s, Morgenthau turned this critique of universal moralism 
directly toward the subject of universal human rights, in an article entitled ―Human 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 246. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid., 249. 
19
 Ibid., 91-92. 
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Rights and Foreign Policy.‖20  For a start, he argued, one must consider ―the 
impossibility of enforcing the universal application of human rights.‖  Secondly, the 
attempt to enforce universal human rights would not be in the national interest, as:  
the United States is incapable of consistently following the path of the defense of human 
rights without manoeuvring itself into a Quixotic position… In other words, the principle 
of the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it 
can and it must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the 
defense of human rights in a particular instance.
21
 
Given these limitations, Morgenthau argued that the rhetoric of universal human 
rights, self-determination, and anti-imperialism, so central to the theory and practice 
of liberal internationalism, amounted to little more than ‗ambiguous ideology‘: a 
justification for a variety of new imperial claims cloaked in morally principled 
language.22  
Universal moral or political principles under this system could, therefore, 
never be fully realised, as state actors would always be subject to the difficulties of 
‗decentralized authority‘ created by the anarchical basis of the international system.  
The attempt to create a universal legal system based on moral norms and utopian ends 
was, therefore, at best an illusion and at worst downright dangerous.  Any attempt to 
claim the universal applicability of international law, particularly on moral grounds, 
would therefore lead to increased conflict as nations fight for or against the moral 
principles at stake.  As Koskenniemi explains: 
Morgenthau agreed with Schmitt in his critique of US utopianism.  It led either into a 
completely unrealistic expectation that one‘s political contenders would feel bound by 
agreements concluded…  or it resulted in the understanding of war as a moral struggle by 
                                                 
20
 The full article is available in Hans Morgenthau, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," in Moral 
Dimensions of American Foreign Policy, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1984). 
21
 Hans Morgenthau, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," in International Human Rights in Context: 
Law, Politics, Morals, ed. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 814. 
22
 Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, 91-93. 
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‗peace-loving nations‘ against the forces of evil; the branding of the enemy as a ‗war 
criminal having committed an ‗act of aggression‘… The only policy directive can then be 
the extreme one: ‗Crush the enemy; force him into unconditional surrender; re-educate 
him in the ways of democratic, peace-loving nations… a United Nations provides the 
finishing touch for the brave new world from which war and, in the words of Mr Cordell 
Hull, power politics itself will have been banished.‘  Like Schmitt, Morgenthau 
interpreted this development as an attempt to get away from politics, intrinsic to the 
liberal world… Such ‗legalistic exercises‘ were outright harmful: ‗At best, they have left 
the political issues where they found them; at worst, they have embittered international 
relations and thus made peaceful settlement of the great political issues more difficult.‘23 
This perspective, insofar as it views international law as little more than the transient 
expression of power by hegemonic states, is useful in the context of this thesis as a 
representation of the dangers inherent in a universal vision of humanitarian 
intervention for the imposition or upholding of human rights.  This is because, as 
Morgenthau suggests, efforts at producing such an order will be subject to endless 
repetition, which is obviously an undesirable outcome if military means are being 
used to enforce humanitarian ideals. 
 Yet while this critique of universal humanitarianism offered by the 
conservative side of international relations is a useful starting point for understanding 
dangers of humanitarian intervention, it is ultimately unsatisfying and insufficient.  
The main problem with Realism as a tool for a critique of this kind is that it never 
escapes the epistemology and ontology of modernism, meaning that the attempt to 
erect a more conservative picture of international politics ‗as it is‘ rather than ‗as it 
ought to be‘ has a similar function to the appeal to universal morality inherent in of 
humanitarian idealism, instead positing the nation-state as the highest power in a sea 
                                                 
23
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960, 
439.  Quotations taken from Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical 
Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1951), 94,102. 
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of anarchy and danger.24  Schmitt‘s alignment with the Nazis in the lead up to World 
War Two25 and Morgenthau‘s veneration as a ‗founding father‘ of U.S. foreign policy 
during the ‗rational‘ nuclear stand-off of the Cold War are indicative of the potential 
dangers of such Realism.26  So while it may well be the case that humanitarianism and 
universal moralism do indeed lead to an increase in the number and brutality of wars 
of intervention, there is a related need to question the relations of power and identity 
that operate at the very foundation of the nation-states themselves.  In this context, 
therefore, the conservative critique is useful only as a starting point for identifying the 
dangers of Australian foreign policy.  In supplementing this critique and taking it a 
little further, I will incorporate a measure of discourse analysis, in order to reveal the 
constitutive presence of an inferior ‗other‘ at the heart of contemporary Australian 
foreign policy.  This, I will argue, intensifies the dangers of current Australian foreign 
policy insofar as it leads to the institution of disciplinary regimes and the infliction of 
violence upon the ‗lesser humans‘ in Australia‘s ―backyard,‖27 as well as antagonising 
neighbours that are unprepared to accept the exceptionalist logic in Australia‘s foreign 
policy rhetoric. 
 
East Timor, 1999 
It is impossible to understand the emergence of a self-righteous and self-assured 
Australian foreign policy at the end of the twentieth century without reference to the 
prevailing economic situation at that time.  In the wake of the Asian financial crisis 
                                                 
24
 For an explanation and assessment of critical approaches toward the divisive discourses of Realism 
see, for example,  Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: a critical (re)introduction to 
international relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), esp. Chapters 1, 4, 8. R. B. J. Walker, 
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
25
 For an accounts of Schmitt‘s political life, emphasising his role in Nazi politics, see Joseph W. 
Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
26
 George, Discourses of Global Politics: a critical (re)introduction to international relations, 92-95. 
27
 Patrick Walters, "PM takes the helm in region," The Australian, 17 May 2006. 
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which began in 1997 and caused economic, social, and political chaos across south-
east Asia, the Australian Government applauded itself for riding out the storm 
unscathed, whilst connecting this apparent economic success with Australia‘s 
‗unique‘ liberal-democratic traditions.28  As 1999 began, it was clear that the 
Government saw Australia as the exceptional nation of the region and envisaged a 
more forthright policy approach to relations with neighbouring countries.  
Importantly, this new approach to Asia was often expressed in didactic terms, with 
Australia presented as the ‗educator‘ of the Asia-Pacific, willing to help those nations 
that needed help, but only insofar as they were willing to help themselves.  Such 
terms are evident in a number of Alexander Downer‘s speeches in early 1999, an 
example of which was the statement to the Australia-Asia Institute that ―just as we are 
helping Indonesia jump its economic hurdles, Australia is just as determined to help it 
successfully get over the high jump bar of electoral credibility.‖29 
 The developing issue of East Timor fed into this exceptionalist vision of 
Australia in the Asia-Pacific, with claims that Australia was the natural leader in 
assisting the East Timorese transition to democratic rule.  There was, however, some 
lingering caution in Alexander Downer‘s statements on the issue, particularly prior to 
the independence ballot and the outbreak of civil conflict.  In March of 1999, Downer 
argued that ―the responsibility for managing the transition process and maintaining 
order in East Timor lies with the parties involved, not with Australia or the 
                                                 
28
 ―we have through our own strong performance shown the region - and the world - what commitment 
to openness and transparency in economic and political affairs can achieve.‖ Alexander Downer, 
Australia's Role in a Region in Crisis: Leading by Example  (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1999 [cited 21 August 2006]); available from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990330_leading_example.html. 
29
 Alexander Downer, Australia - Responding to Indonesia's Transformation  (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1999 [cited 21 August 2006]); available from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990301_indon_trans.html. Even China was 
discussed as a country being guided by Australia, with Downer claiming that ―We have established 
major governance and capacity building facilities in our aid programs for China, Philippines and 
Indonesia.‖ Downer, Australia's Role in a Region in Crisis: Leading by Example. 
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international community.‖30  Later in the year, but still prior to the intervention in 
September, he maintained a respectful and somewhat deferential position on the 
sovereignty question, while still seeking to underline Australia‘s credentials as a 
leader of democratic reform, arguing that ―Australia has no role to play in the internal 
politics of any other country, but we have, at the request of some of our neighbours, 
acted to encourage the development of democracy and democratic institutions in our 
region.‖31  At this stage, Australia‘s role as the only economy unaffected by the Asian 
financial crisis remained at the forefront of Downer‘s speeches, exemplified by the 
bold claim that ―Many years hence, when historians come to write the story of the 
Asian crisis, we can be confident that Australia will rank as one of the heroes of the 
piece.‖32 
 This economic heroism was accompanied by an equal commitment to the 
protection and advancement of human rights throughout the world.  In this regard, 
Australian foreign policy discourse closely reflected the language of Tony Blair, who 
had vociferously campaigned in favour of the humanitarian intervention in Serbia in 
the same year.33  Following Blair‘s ―Doctrine of the International Community‖ 
speech, Downer argued that the pursuit of human rights was in the national interest, as 
well as being of benefit to non-Australians.  This view, according to Downer, was 
based on the fact that: 
pursuit of appropriate standards of human rights appeals to an even more basic aspiration 
amongst Australians - the belief in a ‗fair go‘. We all believe that people should be free 
                                                 
30
 Downer, Australia - Responding to Indonesia's Transformation. 
31
 Downer, Australia's Role in a Region in Crisis: Leading by Example. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 See, in particular,Tony Blair, The Doctrine of the International Community  (Institute of 
International Affairs, Saint Petersburg, 1999 [cited 27th November 2003]); available from 
http://data.cirp.info/intervention/blair-chicago.html. 
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from arbitrary Government action, free from discrimination, free from violence and 
oppression - these are basic values that we all share.
34
 
The idea that human rights are a core ‗value‘ of all Australians provided a segue into 
the ‗Asian values‘ debate, with Downer reaffirming the fact that ―human rights are 
universal rights - they are not some kind of Western import, with little resonance in 
other regions.‖35  From a policy perspective, this meant that Australia‘s work on 
human rights in the region was: 
likely to continue for many years into the future. For while human rights continue to be 
ignored, our own values as Australians are challenged.  So our work goes on. We 
shoulder it in the knowledge that positive results do come, although they may seem to 
come at a glacial pace. But every now and then, like icebergs falling from the glacier into 
the sea, they can come in a rush - as they have done in Indonesia, and elsewhere. It is 
those results that help us keep faith in the inexorable progress of that glacier, and in the 
ultimate triumph of the cause of human rights.
36
 
This speech was made on August 5, 1999, just a few short weeks before Australia‘s 
―effective action on human rights‖ would be sorely tested, as East Timor descended 
into chaos. 
Following the decision by the East Timorese to opt for independence over 
autonomy at the end of August, 1999, Australian policy-makers were caught flat-
footed by the outbreak of violence.  Indeed, in May of the same year, Downer had 
argued against the early deployment of peacekeepers in East Timor to quell any 
possible violence surrounding the upcoming ballot.  In a statement that would find 
echoes in his subsequent rejection of intervention in the Solomon Islands, Downer 
attacked those calling for ‗pre-emptive‘ peacekeepers, arguing that: 
                                                 
34
 Alexander Downer, Australia - Effective Action on Human Rights  (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 1999 [cited 21 August 2006]); available from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990805_aiia.html. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
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We still hear the call from bunyip Napoleons for Australia to send peacekeeping forces to 
East Timor immediately... such people seem to confuse ‗peacekeeping‘ with ‗gunboat 
diplomacy‘ in their enthusiasm for us to ‗go and teach the natives a thing or two‘. Perhaps 
they need to be taught the lesson learnt by my children long ago - that talking tough 
doesn't make you tough, any more than wearing a costume will make you Superman.
37 
Nevertheless, as the violence in East Timor raged in early September, images of death 
and destruction flooded Australian living rooms and were followed by adamant calls 
for the insertion of Australian troops.  By mid-September, following UN Security 
Council approval and the acquiescence of Indonesia, Australia had indeed decided to 
don the Superman costume and fly to the rescue of the beleaguered East Timorese 
people. 
It quickly became clear that the Australian intervention would take on a 
greater significance for Australian foreign policy than Alexander Downer might have 
envisaged.  Following the arrival of Australian troops in East Timor on the 20
th
 of 
September, one Australian tabloid declared that this was to be ―as much a defining 
moment of our national identity as Gallipoli.‖  The troops, according to the editorial 
in the Daily Telegraph, would be ―exposed to danger in unfamiliar foreign territory in 
the interests of peace and democracy,‖ going on to describe an emotional moment 
between the Prime Minister and a soldier‘s mother on talkback radio in which the 
mother ―while understandably concerned about her son‘s safety… was achingly proud 
of him as a soldier and a sworn defender of justice and human rights.‖38  This 
understanding of Australia‘s role as a moral leader in East Timor became the 
definitive understanding of the intervention.  Embracing the idea that Australia had 
brought freedom to East Timor, Downer announced to the Australian parliament that: 
                                                 
37
 Alexander Downer, East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate  (Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999 [cited 21 August 2006]); available from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1999/990525_aiia.html. 
38
 "A Nation Salutes its Brave," The Daily Telegraph, 20 September 1999. 
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"To my dying day, I will be very proud of the fact that we spent an enormous amount 
of time, more than other country on earth, trying to get freedom for the people of East 
Timor.‖39  It was this interpretation of the Australian role in East Timor that added 
more fuel to the Howard Government‘s view that Australia was uniquely suited to 
taking a leadership role on questions of economic and military security in South-East 
Asia. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, in this context, that the now infamous Bulletin 
article by Fred Brenchley - spelling out ―the Howard defence doctrine‖ and giving 
birth to the ―deputy sheriff‖ metaphor – should be published at this time.40  For 
Howard, the success of the intervention in East Timor was a final affirmation of the 
distinctive Australian identity in Asia, such that ―we were defending the values we 
hold as Australians.  We were willing to be in dispute with our nearest neighbour, to 
defend those values.‖41  As Brenchley explained: 
This is where East Timor starts to change the perception of Australia in Asia.  Australia, 
says Howard, will draw strength from its distinctive characteristics of a Western 
civilisation in Asia; an Australia not seeking to fashion itself like the rest of Asia but 
confident about its own character.  He extends his new security doctrine into the moral 
areas of defending ‗right‘; a future Australia not prepared to adopt the ‗please at all costs‘ 
attitude to some Asian leaders of the past.
42
 
This approach, as many would have expected, caused outrage in many South-East 
Asian nations, with an editorial in Malaysia‘s New Straits Times arguing that the 
doctrine ―loudly echoes the arrogant and archaic belief of the Conradian colonial 
masters who deemed it the august role of the white man to bring enlightenment to 
lesser mortals,‖ before going on to argue that: 
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No one will fault her people for being proud of Australia's lead role in an international 
peacekeeping force in strife-torn East Timor but it would be misplaced patriotism and 
triumphalism to transform East Timor into political appendage for greater leadership 
role in Asia.
43
 
Despite these warnings, Howard and Downer have continued to advocate Australian 
leadership in reforming the economic and political cultures of the region.  In his final 
appraisal of Australian foreign policy at the end of the millennium, Alexander 
Downer claimed that this expansive Australian role was welcomed in the region, 
declaring that ―leaders around the world have commended Australia for taking the 
lead on East Timor, and commentators in East Asia praise Australia for showing that 
countries in our region can act to solve our own problems.‖44  It is a theme that has 
come to be embedded in Australian foreign policy discourse over the years that have 
followed and, as I will argue below, has failed to bring security to the people of East 
Timor as well as contributing to an increased sense of insecurity within Australia. 
 
Solomon Islands, 2003 
As 2003 began mixed messages were emerging with regard to Australia foreign 
policy in the Pacific region.  The September 11 attacks and the subsequent declaration 
of a ―War on Terror‖ had preoccupied the Australian government for the preceding 
fifteen months, although attention had been drawn back toward Indonesia with the 
Bali bombings of October 2002.  The looming war against Iraq and continued 
commitments in Afghanistan were of obvious concern in this context, but the ongoing 
civil violence in the Solomon Islands had also crept back on to the agenda, to the 
extent that the Foreign Minister felt the need to publish an article in The Australian 
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detailing why Australia should not intervene in that country to restore peace and 
stability.  In the article, entitled ―Neighbours cannot be recolonised‖, Downer argued 
that: 
Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It 
would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to 
Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to 
continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that 
it would not work - no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a 
Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that 
foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon 
Islands.
45
 
In the light of what occurred in the following months, it is quite incredible that 
Downer chose to publish such a strident statement at this time.  What is most 
important here, however, is to understand the way in which moral discourse and the 
invocation of Australian ‗values‘ came to turn this particular ship around,  to the 
extent that Australian troops were deployed in the Solomon Islands by the end of July 
in the same year. 
The transformation in Australian policy toward the Solomon Islands perhaps 
makes more sense in the light of the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper – 
Advancing the National Interest.  While the affirmation of Pacific island sovereignty 
is reiterated,46 broadly following the contours of Downer‘s earlier article, the White 
Paper contains an introduction claiming that ―it is essential that we continue to 
promote economic and political freedom abroad‖47 and is replete with references to 
the distinctive Australian ideal of ―mateship,‖ and the defence and projection of 
Australian ―values.‖  Most importantly, it states that: 
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Within the Pacific rim, Australia has a particular responsibility to help the countries of 
the South Pacific deal with their deep-seated problems, many of which have been 
exacerbated by poor governance in some states.  We are prepared to help those countries 
which are prepared to help themselves… Our initiatives will focus on developing self-
sufficiency founded on the rock of good governance.
48
 
The centrality of this theme of good governance, and its explicit link to principles of 
human rights and liberal-democracy, establishes a deep sense of Australian 
superiority over Pacific island nations and correlates strongly with the paternal 
policies of guidance and tutelage that are offered in response.  From this point, it is 
only a very small step to move from a policy of non-intervention to one of 
intervention, as the ‗uncivilised‘ masses of the Pacific continue to ‗fail‘ in their 
attempts to successfully administer modern nation states. 
 As 2003 progressed this logic gained greater currency.  On May 1, six weeks 
after ―Operation Iraqi Freedom‖ had gotten underway in Iraq, President Bush declared 
―major combat operations over‖ and argued, in terms very similar to those found in 
the Australian White Paper, that: 
The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the 
world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, 
men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values, and 
American interests, lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty. 
This sense of victory was shared by John Howard in Australia, who declared to 
parliament on May 14 that the war in Iraq was over, that the relationship with the 
United States was stronger than ever, and that the two countries ―share a view of the 
world that values freedom and individual liberty.‖49 
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In this deeply triumphalist context, the added weight of Elsina Wainwright‘s 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute report on the dire political situation in the 
Solomon Islands provided the final touch to turn Australian policy from non-
intervention to intervention.  The report, entitled ―Our Failing Neighbour,‖ invoked 
the idea of the ‗failed state‘ as justification for greater Australian involvement, and 
explicitly linked the potential dangers of the Solomons conflict to the war on terror, 
with the argument that: 
this kind of legal vacuum so close to our shores would make Australia significantly more 
vulnerable to transnational criminal operations based in or operating out of Solomon 
Islands—drug smuggling, gun-running, identity fraud and people smuggling, for 
example. Perhaps even terrorism: the weakness of security institutions means that 
Solomon Islands' capacity to monitor people movements is poor.
50
  
Australia‘s ―front line in the war on terror‖51 was now stretched from South East Asia 
to the South Pacific, ensuring that the Solomon Islands would be a high priority issue 
that would now be subject to corrective intervention. 
Hence, as Tony Wright argued in The Bulletin, ―What was folly in the extreme 
at the start of the year has been turned on its head.‖52  Speculation then surrounded the 
question as to why such a change had taken place, with many focussing on Australia‘s 
perceived role as the leader of the ―war on terror‖ in the region.  This was, as many 
commentators opined, ―a world made very different by the scourge of terrorism,‖ and 
it was incumbent upon Australia – ―a Western country located in the Asia-Pacific 
region‖53 – to resist the spread of terror by repairing ‗failed states‘ in the ‗arc of 
instability‘. 
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Even more worrying was the return to the ―deputy‖ logic that had followed the 
intervention in East Timor, with Wright suggesting that ―Howard is undoubtedly keen 
to prove, to both Australia‘s closest allies and to its own citizens, that his country is 
willing to act as a power in its own neighbourhood.‖54  In a speech to the Sydney 
Instiute in early July, Howard made this case himself, with the statement that: 
 our friends and neighbors in the Pacific are looking to us for leadership and we will not 
fail them.  And the rest of the world, understandably, sees this as an area where Australia 
has particular responsibilities.
55
 
This immodest and somewhat unrealistic comment, that ―the rest of the world‖ sees 
Australia as having ―particular responsibilities‖ in the Pacific region, needs to be 
considered very closely.  The idea of ‗responsibility‘ that it espouses can only be 
justified by reference to the particular political and ideological background that 
Australia has.  This, of course, is precisely what Howard has argued throughout his 
Prime Ministerial career: that Australia‘s ―unique intersection of history, geography, 
and culture‖56 means that Australia has a special place in leading the region toward a 
better future.  It is this attitude, as I will explain further below, that increases hostility 
toward Australia in the region, generating new insecurities that could otherwise have 
been avoided. 
 Despite these dangers, this was a message that Australian journalists and 
political analysts took up with great enthusiasm when the ―cooperative intervention‖ 
in the Solomon Islands was announced in early July, 2003.  Writing in the Sunday 
Telegraph, Stephen Loosley celebrated the fact that ―the Australian Defence Force is 
again being deployed to restore human rights,‖ before concluding that ―this is a clear 
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message of hope that will resonate well beyond Honiara.‖57  Paul Kelly, writing in The 
Australian, claimed that the shift toward interventionism ―represents a post-Iraq 
declaration by Australia to the US of its strategic priorities - it will assume within its 
own region the responsibility of a metropolitan power.‖58  Ian McPhedran put the case 
more bluntly, arguing that ―all those who would seek to hold tiny Pacific states to 
ransom are on notice: ‗Don't mess with your country or the Aussies will arrive in 
force, armed and ready to act.‘‖59 
 So it was that by the end of July, 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was deployed.  Once again, Howard made it clear that he 
considered the South Pacific to be ―our patch,‖ arguing that ―we're willing to do our 
fair share of the heavy lifting in an area that the rest of the world sees as very much 
Australia's responsibility.‖60   Following some early successes in restoring security to 
Honiara, arresting key rebel leaders, and collecting large numbers of weapons, 
everything seemed to be progressing according to plan in the Solomon Islands and, 
indeed, in the broader war on terror.  Likewise, East Timor was being presented 
internationally as a success story for those who have sought to reform the world along 
liberal-democratic lines.61  But in the three years since trouble has been brewing.  In 
both Iraq and Afghanistan the United States, assisted by a small contingent of 
Australian troops, is facing what now look to be unwinnable wars against increasingly 
menacing opponents.  Meanwhile, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, the exemplar 
cases of Australian ‗values‘ and leadership in the region, have also drifted back 
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toward chaotic violence in a context of economic stagnation and political dislocation.  
In the following section, I will argue that the failures of the two missions represent an 
important wake-up call to the Australian Government, indicating that spreading 
Australian ‗values‘ in the region will not necessarily work and may indeed cause 
greater security problems further down the line. 
 
Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, 2006 
As recently as March this year, Michael Fullilove of the Lowy Institute was made a 
cautious but positive assessment of the Australian-led mission in the Solomon Islands, 
arguing that: 
RAMSI has made good progress. It has arrested the Solomons' perilous decline and 
placed the country on a new trajectory. Law and order was quickly restored in 2003 and 
it remains the mission's strong suit. RAMSI is also active in rebuilding the country's 
institutions and reforming its economy, although we do not yet have enough evidence to 
be confident about the sustainability of this success if RAMSI were to leave.
62
 
Little more than a month after publication of this piece, and immediately following 
the first elections in the Solomon Islands, Fullilove‘s prognosis was cast into serious 
doubt, as the Chinatown district of Honiara was demolished by a rampaging mob, 
incensed by what they saw as a corrupt election result.  Even more worrying for the 
Australian Government was the fact that 17 Australian Federal Police were injured in 
the attacks, raising questions over their own popularity amongst the local population.63  
RAMSI, it appeared, did not need to leave in order for a fresh wave of violence to 
erupt in the Solomon Islands, and indeed extra troops were disptached from Australia 
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in order to again supress the angry mob.  Alexander Downer visited Honiara the 
following week, declaring that more change was necessary and that: 
we need to keep pushing on and, as I said to the Prime Minister, it's a matter of life or 
death for Solomon Islands as a country. It needs to continue the process of economic 
reform, it needs to encourage investment and it needs a higher degree of political 
stability. 
It is interesting to consider what the ‗death‘ of the Solomon Islands would look like, 
and what implications it would have for the people that live there.  This question 
aside, Downer was compelled to announce that: 
We are putting enormous amounts of money in here - through projects. I mean, 
Australians would be relieved to hear that we're not paying cheques to people here - 
we're just running project aid here.
64
 
Despite repeated protestations to the contrary, the arrogant touch of an imperial power 
is all too evident in statements such as this.  Once again, the sense of superiority 
inherent in this statement must be deeply troubling for those who are considered not 
trustworthy enough to receive Australian cheques, and for those who worry that 
Australia is simply repeating the failed colonial experiment of the previous century.  
The troubles raised by the riots were compounded for the Australian 
Government only a few days later, as East Timor (now the independent nation-state of 
Timor Leste) also descended into chaos.  Rival groups of police and military clashed 
openly in Dili and, following a month of tension and attempts at negotiation between 
the fighting groups, armed gangs took advantage of the situation by looting and 
burning throughout the capital in late May.  As was the case in the Solomon Islands, 
Australian troops were disptached to quell the violence and allow for the provision of 
food and medicine to those who required it.  
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In an interview on the 29
th
 of May, Howard offered a blunt analysis of the 
situation in East Timor: 
We stayed for a long period of time as part of the United Nations force and then the 
United Nations decided it was time to let them run their own show. Now sadly they 
haven‘t done a very good job of it. They asked us to come back and help them, we‘ve 
done that immediately and we‘ll be encouraging them to run their own show again. We‘ll 
be giving them help, we‘ll be giving them advice, but in the end if it is to be an 
independent country, East Timor has got to run itself.
65
 
What is most interesting about this statement is the abdication of responsibility that is 
so much a part of the interventionist discourse.  Rather than seeking to understand the 
problems inherent in any nation-building program and attempting to rethink the 
appropriateness of what often appears to be a direct repetition of colonisation and 
decolonisation experiences, Howard argued that all blame for the violence and 
destruction lay with the incapable people of both nations.  What is evident here is a 
crude application of neo-liberal self-help principles, in which Australia views itself as 
providing an equal playing field but then adopts a laissez-faire attitude in which 
responsibility for success or failure resides with the ‗freed‘ individual state.  
For Howard, therefore, it was easy to claim that the recurring problems in the 
Solomons and East Timor were a product of a combination of poor governance and 
the inherently unstable region in which Australia resides. Hence, rather than being 
related in any way to the failures of RAMSI or the Australian Government: 
What has happened is a reminder of the instability of the region in which we live. It‘s a 
reminder that we live in a part of the world that carries with it the constant threat of 
failed states, and as a stable united prosperous nation in the region we know it is in our 
interest as well as the interest of the region that we prevent states from failing because 
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failed states become the breeding grounds for all sorts of ideologies and attitudes and 
developments which can pose a threat to the stability of the whole region.
66
 
This externalisation of the problem was coupled (once again) with references to 
Australia‘s leading role as an educator of good political and social values in the 
region.67  Australia, in other words, represents all that is good in the Asia-Pacific 
region, while the failing states surrounding it lack the maturity and knowledge - 
translated as ―good governance‖ – represent all that needs to be corrected.  In this 
context, according to Howard, it would be folly to ignore ―the reality that the rest of 
the world looks to Australia to shoulder the lion‘s share of the burden of providing 
support and stability not only for the people of the Solomon Islands but also for other 
small nations which may find themselves in the same situation.‖68  The same message 
emerged on his tour of the United States and Britain in May.  As one newspaper 
reported: 
In his talks in Washington, Mr. Howard signaled a more active, interventionist path for 
Australia as the leading regional power in the South Pacific.  ―I indicated that this was an 
area where Australia accepted major responsibility, a lead responsibility,‖ he said after 
the talks.  ―The Pacific is our backyard and we are the country that has the prime 
responsibility for looking after the security exigencies as they arise.‖69 
In repeating these claims to ownership (―our backyard‖) and responsibility (or even 
superiority), Howard not only denigrates the poorer nations like Timor Leste and 
Solomon Islands, but also opens Australia up to allegations of neo-imperialism, 
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bullying, and arrogance, particularly from relatively powerful South-East Asian 
nations like Indonesia and Malaysia.   
In the context of a highly volatile international environment, in which the 
prospect for major disturbances seems remarkably high (Howard himself referred the 
Pacific as ―the stadium of the next century‖), it seems incredibly dangerous and 
counterproductive to be antagonising neighbours in this way.  Indeed, in the wake of 
the violence in Timor Leste and Solomon Islands in 2006, questions began to emerge 
over Australia‘s ability to rebuild the two countries and over the potential dangers that 
were gathering as a result of the interventionist approach.  Susan Windybank, for 
example, argued that ―RAMSI has fed into cargo-cult expectations that whenever 
there is trouble, Australia will charge in and write a blank cheque to put things right‖ 
and  that ―Australia runs a real risk of getting bogged down as a de facto government 
that fails its job,‖ leading to situation in which ―Australia's credibility in the Pacific is 
on the line.‖70  Paul Kelly, writing in The Australian prior to the Australian 
deployment in Timor Leste, argued that Australia‘s claim to responsibility for the 
region was ―inevitable, regrettable and perhaps undeliverable‖ and ―highlights the 
activism bordering on hubris that pervades military policy.‖71  Others, such as Paul 
Dibb and Andrew Clark, questioned the ability of the Australian military to meet 
current and likely future deployment needs in a context of increasing regional 
instability.72  John Pilger struck a more conspiratorial note with the revelation that:  
A leaked Australian Defence Force document has since revealed that Australia's ‗first 
objective‘ in East Timor is to ‗seek access‘ for the Australian military so that it can 
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exercise ‗influence over East Timor's decision-making.‘ A Bushite ‗neo-con‘ could not 
have put it better.
73
 
Amidst all the recriminations and prognostications, some serious questions 
about the future of Australian foreign policy must be considered: Would Australia be 
capable of responding to an increasing number of ‗state failures‘ in the region?  
Would Australian citizens accept the billion dollar costs if such interventions 
produced no tangible benefits?  Would they accept conscription for their family 
members in order to spread Australian ‗values‘?  Does playing deputy to the United 
States increase or decrease Australian security?  To many of these questions are left 
out of the picture as simplistic, nationalistic moral triumphalism overshadows careful 
consideration of costs and consequences.  As a result, despite the harsh lessons 
offered by the recent outbreaks of violence in Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, the 
Australian Government presses ahead with its foreign policy program.  
 
The dangers to come? 
Despite the costs and failures encountered over the past seven years, John Howard‘s 
foreign policy agenda has not budged.  His defence doctrine, as outlined in the 
Brenchley article of 1999, remains the same: Greater defence spending, stronger 
alliance with the United States, values-based leadership in the region, and more 
interventionist activity.  As Howard recently explained: 
I can safely say that expenditure on defence will be going up and the resources needed 
for defence, largely because of the volatility of our own region, I mean we had to go back 
into East Timor and we have got commitments in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Solomon 
Islands, in East Timor, and it is just that kind of world.  It is going to be like that now for 
                                                 
73
 John Pilger, "Australia builds its empire," New Statesman 135, no. 4798 (2006). 
Jeremy Moses: Moral Triumphalism in Recent Australian Foreign Policy 
 
 28 
years into the future because we are seen by the rest of the world as the sort of security 
guardian of our region.
74
 
This general statement was backed up in late August with a commitment of an extra 
ten billion dollars to the expansion of the Australian military, again with references to 
the abundance of ‗failing states‘ in the region and the need for Australia to take 
responsibility for ―our own patch.‖75  There are, furthermore, many enthusiastic 
adherents to this vision who are willing to promote the cause of a powerful Australian 
presence in the region.  Greg Sheridan, for example, has argued that: 
It is perhaps time that Australia conceived of itself as the ‗US of the South Pacific‘… 
mentoring and tutoring devastated societies into economic and political modernisation 
and, crucially, providing for their security in the meantime. And like the US in Asia, we 
should do this in part through a system of military deployments, though naturally we 
would not call them Australian bases.
76
 
Such an approach is highly unlikely to win Australia any friends in the region, and nor 
will it achieve any kind of serious improvements for the impoverished communities 
that collectively constitute the ‗arc of instability‘.  Indeed, we would do well to 
remember that the arrogance of 18
th
 and 19
th
 century colonialism and imperialism 
created the system that has in turn produced current regional instabilities, suggesting 
that a return to that model will produce nothing but further impoverishment, conflict, 
and insecurity.  Alternatively, one could respond, as the Government of Papua New 
Guinea did in late August, that the increases in Australian defence spending are more 
related to Australia‘s ongoing commitment to the futile wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
than they are to any genuine regional concerns. 77 
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 I would argue that the causes for concern run even deeper for Australia.  The 
adherence to the ‗regional deputy‘ logic and the concurrent strengthening of ties with 
the United States adds an even more dangerous, although perhaps longer term, threat 
to Australian security.  With the Adelaide-Darwin railway link operated by 
Halliburton‘s Australian arm,78 a recent agreement to allow more US military testing 
on Australian soil, the potential for an agreement to build US bases in northern 
Australia,79 and the current discussions over Australia‘s future status as a (nuclear) 
―energy superpower,‖80 questions must be asked as to whether Australia is gearing up 
to take an even more prominent role in long-term US strategy in Asia.  Most 
obviously, we need to consider whether the current commitment to ‗shared values‘ 
with the United States is blinding policy makers to the potentially disastrous 
consequences of making Australia a key strategic target in any future conflict in the 
region, perhaps involving North Korea, or even – in the worst possible scenario - 
China.   
From this perspective, Alexander Downer would do well to remember his pre-
intervention comments on East Timor, in which he suggested that those arguing in 
favour of ‗pre-emptive‘ intervention ―need to be taught the lesson… that talking tough 
doesn't make you tough, any more than wearing a costume will make you 
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Superman.‖81  The fact that the Australian Government was rebuked by the 
Indonesian Government following the acceptance of West Papuan refugees in April 
throw this issue into even starker relief.  That the Australian Government was 
compelled to introduce bizarre new immigration laws to parliament in an attempt to 
appease the Indonesians gives us a much better indication of Australia‘s relative 
power in the region.  On another point, the Government should ensure that before 
talking tough on regional matters that domestic abuses of human rights (particularly 
the appalling state of Aboriginal health) and corruption (of which the Australian 
Wheat Board scandal is an excellent example) should be dealt with before any attempt 
is made to correct the failings of the rest of the world. 
Australia is a country that is in a privileged position of not needing to stick its 
neck out on the most fraught international issues and conflicts of our time.  While 
there may be some need to participate in activities that will assist citizens of poorer 
states in the region, there is no need to couch this in chest-thumping nationalist terms 
that implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) denigrate neighbouring countries.  There 
is no need, nor is there any firm basis, to claim moral leadership of what is a diverse 
and complex  region of the world.  There is no need to deeply involve Australia in the 
war on terror, or to make Australia into a centre of nuclear supply, or to build US 
bases on Australian soil, such that it becomes a key strategic target in any future 
regional conflict.  What is required is some modest reflection on what is best for the 
security of Australian citizens, now and in to the future.  As the people of Iraq or 
Lebanon will attest, no-one wants to experience a war in their own country, and 
national leaders should always gear their foreign policy toward the avoidance of war.  
Furthermore, they should ensure that domestic society is functioning well before 
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charging off to solve the problems of the rest of the world.  Too often the claim to 
moral superiority in international affairs glosses over the internal failings and 
conflicts that dog Australian society and politics.  Conservative thinkers such as 
Schmitt, Carr, and Morgenthau have offered compelling critiques of humanitarian 
wars and moral triumphalism in foreign policy, and the Australian Government would 
do well to revisit those texts and heed those warnings before greater calamities are 
visited upon the Australian people. 
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